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INTRODUCTION
For nearly 40 years now, the Mexican armed
forces have been engaged in tasks that are
more closely aligned with public safety than
national security. Mexico’s armed forces
have in fact been asked to contribute to
the national well-being through a wide
range of activities, such as dealing with the
aftermath of natural disasters, running health
campaigns, managing anti-hunger facilities,
safeguarding national strategic facilities,
patrolling Mexico’s exclusive economic zones,
and helping in public safety and security
operations, particularly against organized
crime. In addition, they are now being asked
to lead national efforts on cyber defense and
participate in international peace operations.
This is a broad agenda for a relatively small
military—around 270,000 active personnel.
Of these responsibilities, none is more
controversial than efforts to utilize the armed
forces in public safety and internal security.
There is indeed a growing debate in Mexico
on the armed forces’ role in fighting drug
trafficking and organized crime, and taking
on public safety and internal security duties
in cities and states around the country.
Engaging the armed forces in these types
of responsibilities is even more contentious
because their precise role in such tasks is
unclear and their participation remains largely
unregulated. Vis-à-vis this lack of regulatory
definition, key questions have emerged. What
are the terms and limits of the armed forces’
involvement in public safety and internal

security? What are the armed forces’ rules
of engagement in such activities? When and
how will they be held accountable if they
exceed their mandated duties?
The Mexican armed forces have a long
tradition of loyalty to the government,
and their participation in what they call
“solidary and subsidiary activities” is largely
motivated by their sense of duty. When they
have been called to act, they have done so
with little resistance. But the Mexican public
is increasingly uneasy with the armed forces’
role and participation in security, particularly
because they operate in a regulatory limbo
and have recently been accused of human
rights abuses, abductions, torture, forced
disappearances, and sexual assaults.1
Even though there have been some
efforts to hold the armed forces accountable
for their performance,2 the main problem
is that no one really knows exactly what
the armed forces are supposed to do, even
if everyone can cite a long list of activities
that the armed forces engage in. The lack
of clarity on their role in public safety and
internal security has brought them into close
contact with civilians without clear rules
or adequate training on engaging citizens
on a day-to-day basis. This has opened the
military to accusations of due process and
human rights violations, allegations that the
armed forces have exceeded their stated
institutional capacity, and concerns that the
limits of their involvement in terms of time,
territory, jurisdictional authority, etc. have
been set arbitrarily.
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A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARMED
FORCES ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC
SAFETY AND INTERNAL SECURITY
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Mexico’s armed forces do not act in
a vacuum. There is a constitutional
framework that outlines their role.3 But by
design, the constitution is vague and does
not provide operational guidance. The 1986
Law of the Army and the Air Force and the
2002 Law of the Navy are two enabling acts
(Leyes Orgánicas) that attempt to shape
the role of the armed forces in Mexico.4
And although both laws call on the armed
forces to participate in “internal security”
activities, there is no additional regulation
defining what this means or the terms,
limits, and conditions of their engagement.
Also, neither law makes a clear distinction
between public safety, internal security,
or national defense, conflating them all
into a vague concept of “internal security.”
To illustrate this confusion, the armed
forces are tasked with duties (enumerated
above), that in the United States would be
separated into law enforcement, homeland
security, and national defense.
The absence of clearer legislation and
regulations on the operations of the armed
forces, particularly when exercising law
enforcement duties, has left the armed
forces open to allegations of illegal actions
and of due process and human rights abuses
when interacting with the civilian population.

FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES
IN THE LAW
According to Mexico’s Organic Law on the
Army and the Air Force (Title I, Article 1),
the general missions of the army and air
force are: 1) to defend the nation’s integrity,
independence, and sovereignty; 2) to
guarantee internal security; 3) to attend to
the public needs of the civilian population;
4) to advance the country’s progress
through civic actions and social projects;
and 5) in the case of a disaster, to maintain
public order, help people in need and
protect their possessions, and reconstruct
affected zones.

Based on the maintenance of public order
clause, for decades, the armed forces have
been involved in an unconventional strategy
to combat organized crime. To achieve this
aim, the armed forces have participated in
public safety and security operations, but
without a clear mandate, well-established
operating procedures, or even legal
protections for themselves or citizens
while performing these duties. Since 2007,
their involvement has become even more
controversial, as evidence has emerged of
incidents of extra-judicial executions, torture,
rape, and numerous violations of Mexican
citizens’ constitutional rights. Since 2006, the
National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH,
for its acronym in Spanish5) has “received
approximately 9,000 complaints of abuse
by the armed forces, and issued reports in
over 100 cases in which it found that army
personnel had committed serious human
rights violations.”6 There also have been
allegations of major human rights abuses, like
the military’s massacre of disarmed gunmen
in Tlatlaya, State of Mexico, in June 2014.7 The
Federal Police, however, has been accused
of these same human rights abuses, as in
Tanhuato, Michoacán, on May 22, 2015.8

SELF-REGULATION AND THE NEED
FOR A NEW LAW
In response to a new reality in Mexico in
terms of security, President Enrique Peña
Nieto instructed the armed forces to create
a National Defense Policy document. In this
document, named the “2013–2018 Sectorial
Program for National Defense,” the armed
forces attempt to outline their strategy and
create guidelines for their operations in
public safety and security engagement in a
complicated domestic security environment.
Unfortunately, this document is not
regulatory or even compulsory but merely
declarative in nature. It was also largely
written by consultants, with relatively little
participation of the armed forces themselves.
Similarly, the armed forces also established
the Joint National Defense Plan, which
outlines how the two military departments—
the Department of National Defense and the
Department of the Navy—will coordinate their
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actions in public safety and internal security.
These plans are not legislation, however, and
the armed forces have maintained that most
of the content is confidential, arguing that
releasing the information would compromise
their mission. Unfortunately, such secrecy
also limits democratic accountability.
It is also worth noting that the Mexican
armed forces have in fact argued for
the need for legislation to regulate their
activities since at least as far back as the
Calderón administration, and President
Calderón himself had a bill drafted, but
he failed to send it to Congress and the
Mexican congress has refused to debate the
issue. Clearly, neither President Calderón
nor President Peña has made it a legislative
priority.9 Thus, much of the problem is
related to legislative inaction. The armed
forces have designed their own strategic
documents without effective legal limits on
their operations. More recently, in April 2016,
the Mexican congress approved changes to
the Military Justice Code, giving the military
broad powers to search and seize homes and
facilities, including the ability to search and
seize the offices of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches. It also enables the
military to conduct electronic surveillance.
All of these activities, presumably, can
only be done when investigating crimes
committed by military personnel, but in a
country where crime levels are high, nearly
anyone can be spied on under the excuse
that it is somehow connected to criminal
activities. It is worrisome, however, that
this enables the military to investigate
itself, rather than bringing them under the
jurisdictional control of civil justice.
In a sense, while Latin America has
moved away from expanding the role of the
military in civil society and justice, Mexico,
which had been a role model for civil control
of the military for much of the 20th century,
is moving in the opposite direction.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AS THE
BASIS FOR ANY NEW LAW
New comprehensive legislation on the armed
forces and their role in public safety (if any
is advisable) and internal security (if at all) is

urgent in Mexico. New legislation, however,
would require a national debate on the
meaning of and agents for public safety and
internal security. Conflating these two with
national defense may no longer make sense
for the armed forces as Mexico transitions
to a functioning democracy. There needs
to be a clear distinction among all three
concepts. Moreover, although it is true
that state-to-state wars are diminishing
in number and that non-state actors have
acquired the capability to threaten states,
there may no longer be a reason to involve
the military in fighting organized crime or
providing internal security, if better suited
law enforcement organizations have not
first been given a chance. It may be better
to reorganize the entire domestic security
apparatus in favor of leaving the military out
of everything but national defense.
If Mexico’s political leadership continues
to leave these concepts undefined in the
law and congress refuses to restructure the
country’s public safety, internal security,
and national defense bureaucracies with
clear and democratic limits, the armed
forces will continue to be mired in confusion,
risk the continual deterioration of their
image, and violate the law—and the Mexican
public will wrest support away from the
Armed forces, which heretofore continue
to be one of the most highly respected
institutions by the Mexicans.

The armed forces
require a law that
reframes and
modernizes the
concepts of public
safety, internal
security, and national
defense; clarifies the
role, conditions, terms,
and limits of the armed
forces’ engagement;
and establishes
mechanisms to hold
them accountable.

WITHOUT A NEW LAW
To reiterate, the worst scenario for Mexico,
the armed forces, and the Mexican public
is that the status quo remains. The armed
forces require a law that reframes and
modernizes the concepts of public safety,
internal security, and national defense;
clarifies the role, conditions, terms, and
limits of the armed forces’ engagement;
and establishes mechanisms to hold them
accountable. Without a new law, Mexico’s
armed forces will continue to come into
contact with the civilian population without
an understanding of their civil and political
rights. Moreover, they will continue to be
accused of massacres, as in the case of
Tlatlaya, and torture and rape, among other
3
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abuses.10 Citizens and NGOs will not know
where to draw the line in their interactions
with the armed forces or how to hold them
accountable if and when they exceed the
limits of their mandate.
Without a new law, political and elected
officials can use the armed forces at will,
as there is no guide for when they can be
called into action. Finally, they will clearly
continue to be overextended, not just in
their activities, but also in their institutional
and material capabilities, which can only
distract from what should be their main
mission: readiness for national defense.

CONCLUSION
A new law governing public safety and
internal security is long overdue in Mexico.
This is most apparent in the increasingly
controversial role of the armed forces in the
country’s public safety and internal security
fields. Congress must act soon. The failure
to enact legislation will have detrimental
consequences for both the armed forces and
Mexico’s fragile democracy.
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